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During the present Afghanistan mission,  the report ing of 
casualties receives more media 
attention than any other aspect of 
Canadian operations. Usually within 
a day, the life story of each fatality 
appears in the media, followed by 
footage of the ramp ceremony and 
reports from the hometown funeral. 
Politicians debated whether to lower 
the national flag on the Peace Tower 
after every fatality. None of this could 
have occurred during the Second 
World War due to limitations in 
communications, administration 
and the sheer number of casualties. 
Processing each casualty report 
overseas, dispatching it to Ottawa 
and then to the next-of-kin, while 
allowing sufficient time before 
publication in the press, took days 
and often weeks. The Canadian 
Army sometimes suffered more 
casualties in a single day of battle 
than its entire losses in Afghanistan. 
Nor are there the same levels of 
security concerns since limited losses 
do not allow the Taliban to use 
casualty reports to estimate combat 
effectiveness of Canadian units. 
Obviously, in 1939-1945 there could 
not be today’s level of discussion 
about individual casualties in the 
national media, nor the capability 
of transmitting the news as quickly. 
Nonetheless, casualty reporting 
constituted an important element of 
the army’s handling of operational 
news. This article examines the 
machinery and politics behind the 
notification of next-of-kin and the 
publication of casualty names and 
numbers in the news media. Even 
though the army generally wished 
to notify the family, members and 
public as quickly and accurately as 
possible, it could not always do so. 
Unofficial communications with 
the family, procedural failures, and 
more frequently press and censorship 
errors, caused occasional mistakes 
in casualty reporting. Moreover, the 
interests and regulations of Canada’s 
senior allies often prevented the 
timely publication of casualty 
names and figures usually on the 
grounds of security, sometimes with 
questionable justification, frequently 
resulting in conflict.
 The administration of army 
casualty reporting went through 
numerous small refinements during 
the war, but the basic structure 
and procedure remained relatively 
c o n s t a n t .  C a n a d i a n  M i l i t a r y 
Headquarters (CMHQ) in London 
served as the overseas records office 
and conduit for transmitting casualty 
reports to Ottawa. Initially, the 
administrative procedure for each 
casualty report was painstaking; an 
individual casualty card had to be 
processed, double-checked with the 
unit and against existing casualty 
records files, before transmission 
to the records office at National 
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).1 
As the army grew in size and some 
Canadian formations deployed to the 
Mediterranean and later to France, 
CMHQ could no longer confirm 
each casualty with his unit. Instead, 
the Second Echelon, the support and 
administrative units of the army, 
received the information in the 
theatre from units and hospitals and 
forwarded it to CMHQ. Once the 
cable arrived at the Directorate of 
Records in Ottawa, the information 
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was again processed and a telegram 
of notification sent to the next-of-
kin. The name was added to the 
publication list only after confirmation 
of the notification’s receipt. This took 
time: according to a March 1944 army 
press release, “a casualty notice can 
hardly be expected to reach Canada 
in less than a week or ten days.”2 Two 
of the major objectives of this system 
were preventing mistaken reports 
and ensuring the next-of-kin did not 
have the shock of learning about the 
death of a family member from a 
media report.
 Despite  these  painstaking 
precautions, mistakes happened. In 
some cases, the responsibility for error 
lay with the army itself. During the 
aftermath of the bloody Dieppe raid in 
August 1942, many mistakes resulted 
from waiving normal procedures 
to speed through the enormous 
number of casualties clogging up 
the untried system. To speed the 
process, Second Echelon telephoned 
casualties to Records “before they 
had been able to do a proper check.”3 
The initial information was based on 
inaccurate pre-embarkation lists and 
sometimes on anecdotal information 
collected at the check posts as the 
men returned from the raid, which 
resulted in reports of death based on 
“hearsay evidence” alone.4 No formal 
courts of inquiry were held until 
nine or ten days later. Conducted 
by the individual units, with sworn 
eyewitness evidence, they provided 
re l iable  answers  about  many 
casualties.5 Unfortunately, numerous 
cables were despatched prior to this. 
The records office deliberately cabled 
the names to Ottawa, even though 
they were aware that the status of 
some casualties would change. It 
was more important, in the light of 
the pressure from NDHQ, to get the 
names out quickly, with some errors, 
than to delay their transmission and 
ensure accuracy. This did not prevent 
NDHQ from later complaining about 
changes in the status of casualties that 
grieved the next-of-kin.6 
 This departure from normal 
procedure resulted in the categories 
of some casualties changing two or 
even three times. The exact numbers 
of changes were described “as a 
small percentage” of the casualties, 
but they may have been as high as 14 
percent.7 These changes in category 
doubtless led to unnecessary grief in 
many Canadian homes. For example, 
Mrs. R.W. Barton of Toronto was 
told her son was missing, the next 
day he was reported as safe, but 
several days later he returned to 
missing status.8 The rush to get the 
casualties to next-of-kin doubtless 
was beneficial to those who received 
correct information, but it caused 
immense uncertainty for those who 
received inaccurate cables.
 Nor was Dieppe the only time that 
the army made mistakes in casualty 
reporting. Serious delays in next-of-
kin notification took place during the 
Sicilian campaign in July and August 
1943. In July 1943, the casualty 
notification telegrams experienced 
“lengthy delays” because they 
competed with operational traffic 
that took first priority. Although 
Second Echelon received its own 
equipment allowing communication 
with London, it still could not use 
it on 24 July because Eisenhower’s 
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) 
had not yet assigned it a radio 
frequency.9 Because of the delayed 
casualty reports, the instances of 
next-of-kin learning of casualties by 
other channels increased and resulted 
in some anger in the press, which will 
be discussed below.
 Another embarrassing situation 
arose on 30 December 1943, at the 
Army Directorate of Records at 
NDHQ, when a typist, processing 
four casualties, mistakenly entered 
“killed” in the place of “wounded” 
on the duplicator stencil. The correct 
status already appeared on an earlier 
form, but another clerk changed 
that form to match the incorrect 
stencil. As a result, the next-of-kin 
of the four men received telegrams 
notifying them of the soldiers’ 
deaths. The error escaped detection 
despite three checking points in the 
procedure, including a review by 
the directorate duty officer. The four 
soldiers remained deceased until 
resurrected by an update on the 
condition of one of the wounded, 
Casualty notification during the 
Canadian mission to Afghanistan is 
considerably quicker, and more public, 
than the official system in place during 
the Second World War.
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alerting the Directorate of Records 
to the error, who sent the correct 
information to the next-of-kin.10 A 
10 January 1944 Canadian Press (CP) 
story reported the outrage of one 
of the families, and the Edmonton 
branch of the Canadian Legion sent 
a protest to NDHQ. The story, as 
carried by the Ottawa Journal, came to 
the notice of NDHQ and the records 
office. A resulting investigation led to 
changes that ensured more stringent 
double-checking in the office.11 It is 
no coincidence that two weeks later 
a press release from NDHQ Army 
Public Relations described a visit 
by Minister of National Defence J. 
Layton Ralston to the Casualties 
Section of the Directorate of Records. 
He underscored the need for accuracy 
and speed to the staff and said that he 
was “deeply impressed by the great 
care taken by the casualty section to 
guard against errors.”12 
 Despite the steps taken after 
January 1944, a similar mistake 
happened in November 1944 when 
a Toronto mother, informed of the 
death of her officer son, within 
hours received a second telegram 
explaining that the first cable was 
erroneous and he had suffered only 
a light wound. Unfortunately, the 
records department did not correct 
the inaccuracy in the publication list 
for the newspapers and the error was 
repeated.13 Mistakes happened more 
frequently during the campaign in 
Northwest Europe. A Directorate 
of Records memorandum dated 
10 October 1944 complained about 
delays and inaccuracies in the reports 
sent both by units at the front and 
the hospitals. Progress reports on 
“dangerously ill” and “seriously 
ill” came only rarely, while the 
directorate felt they should be weekly 
or bi-weekly. “Discrepancies and 
mistakes in reporting” also resulted 
from “carelessness in the writing of 
cables” and “adding inexperienced 
personnel in the peak period we are 
going through.”14 
 Thus, despite the attempts by 
the army to avoid errors and delay, 
circumstances and clerical mistakes 
occasionally resulted in the next-of-
kin receiving erroneous or belated 
casualty reports. Sometimes, as in 
Sicily, the army, despite its best efforts 
to send casualty notification, ran into 
difficulties beyond its control. At 
other times, such as Dieppe and the 
autumn of 1944, the sheer number of 
casualties increased the likelihood 
of error. The information received 
in Canada always depended on 
the accuracy of the report from 
the front, during heavy fighting; 
mistakes were inevitable because 
casualty reports did not always 
have priority for the staff of combat 
units. In any case, the mere fact that 
casualty reports involved at least four 
steps before reaching the next-of-kin 
increased the possibility of clerical 
mistakes. While understandable 
and probably inevitable, these errors 
caused unnecessary grief and worry 
for the families affected by them.
 In addition to military blunders in 
notifying next-of-kin, sometimes the 
families of casualties received notice 
through unofficial communications, 
often from other soldiers or even 
callous hoaxers. Sometimes this news 
was completely false or misleading. 
In April 1940, the Globe and Mail 
reported that the father of a corporal 
in the Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry received word of his 
son’s death in Norway. Since the 
Canadian Army denied rumours of 
having troops in Norway, this became 
front-page news. The story puzzled 
officials at NDHQ, but quick inquiries 
requested by Gillis Purcell of the CP 
revealed the supposedly deceased 
soldier still with his company in 
the UK. It never surfaced whether 
the parents were victims of a hoax 
or some kind of administrative 
mistake.15 On other occasions, cruel 
deceivers telephoned the next-of-kin 
of service personnel informing them 
of their family member’s death. A 
November 1942 RCAF press release 
described this hoax as occurring 
“frequently” and indicated that 
there were multiple perpetrators. 
Canadian prisoners of war led through 
Dieppe by German soldiers. These men 
made up the bulk of the “missing” 
casualties held back from publication 
for a month at British insistence.
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Newspapers reported other occasions 
and with other services and no doubt 
this could have occurred with the 
army as well.16
 More often unofficial reports 
of casualties came through well-
meaning letters from other soldiers. 
After Dieppe, grieving next-of-
kin received shocking news by 
these unofficial channels, although 
this was contrary to regulations. 
While censorship of soldiers’ mail 
existed, it tended to be haphazard 
and many soldiers and officers 
ignored the rules.17 While those 
writing casualties’ families were well 
intentioned, they probably did not 
resolve the uncertainty; as long as no 
official word came, hope doubtless 
remained. Other next-of-kin were 
stunned when letters addressed 
to missing personnel returned, 
mistakenly stamped “deceased.”18 
This was a result of two foul ups: the 
unit prematurely labelling a missing 
man as deceased, and the letter being 
returned instead of sent to the dead 
letter office.19
 The practise of personnel writing 
to next-of-kin continued after Dieppe. 
A 10 October 1944 Directorate of 
Records memorandum outlined 
the problems caused by unofficial 
notifications:
A great amount of casualties, both 
fatal and otherwise, are being 
reported to the next-of-kin by 
personal cables and mail long before 
the official report is received at 
this office. This not only puts this 
Headquarters in an embarrassing 
position but adds greatly to the 
burden of answering enquiries on a 
matter which has not been officially 
reported to this office. A notable 
example of this occurred lately when 
H/Capt. Mooney, a R.C. Chaplain, 
was killed in action, the news of his 
death was “officially” reported to all 
RC district Chaplains in Canada by 
the Principal Chaplain (RC), almost 
one week before the notification cable 
was received in this office.20
The memorandum failed to mention 
the uncertainty that the next-of-kin 
experienced until officially notified. 
Much of the blame for the situation 
addressed in the memorandum 
lay with the slowness of official 
communications. While a private 
cable might conceivably beat military 
telegraph communication back to 
Canada, soldier’s mail should not 
have. The writers may sometimes 
have expected the recipient to possess 
the news by the time the letter 
arrived. 
 A similar situation occurred 
during the Sicily campaign with 
the casualty notifications hampered 
by the lack of a Second Echelon 
radio frequency. Additionally, 
mountainous terrain, poor quality 
batteries,  and a lack of  radio 
equipment due to the loss of supply 
ships meant that communications 
between Canadian units proved 
di f f i cu l t ,  adding  to  casual ty 
reporting delays.21 This resulted in 
the inevitable informal revelations. 
The most conspicuous case, which 
the Conservative Globe and Mail 
attempted to turn into a government 
embarrassing cause célèbre, involved 
the family of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ralph Crowe of the Royal Canadian 
Regiment, killed on 24 July. On 6 
August several journalists asked 
the family for pictures of Crowe, 
explaining they wanted pictures of all 
members of the regiment. The family 
later learned that stories of Crowe’s 
death began circulating at the local 
military district headquarters that 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Crowe (right) 
and Major J.H.W. Pope of the Royal 
Canadian Regiment were both killed 
in Sicily. The delay in notifying Crowe’s 
next-of–kin caused public controversy.
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same day. Two days later the family 
received a 30 July letter from a 
Canadian Public Relations officer in 
London, a friend, informing them 
of the news. Seeking confirmation, 
the family made inquir ies  to 
NDHQ, through the local military 
district, which reported that it had 
no notification. “The assured and 
relieved” family received the official 
telegram the next day. The Globe 
and Mail quoted the remarks of an 
unnamed officer, a family friend, that 
the situation was “difficult to justify” 
and he hoped that the publicity 
would lead to “some reorganization 
of the records [system] and press 
releases” so “that a similar experience 
not will not come to next of kin of 
future casualties in this war.”22 
 A response by NDHQ explained 
that overcrowded communications 
systems resul ted  in  casual ty 
notifications delays “during the 
first three weeks of the Sicilian 
campaign” and “a number of 
despatches failed to reach base 
during that period.” NDHQ knew 
of a report of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Crowe’s death but it “had not been 
confirmed.”23 The Globe and Mail, 
unimpressed by the explanation, 
published several editorials accusing 
the army of “brutal callousness,” 
although perhaps not “intentional,” 
since information in London on 30 
July should have reached NDHQ the 
next day. An even stronger critique 
followed after the editors learned of 
a second officer’s family informed 
unofficially of his death. The editorial 
accused NDHQ of “inexcusable 
fumbling,” dismissing its explanation 
as “a piece of deplorable casuistry” 
and condemning the Ottawa HQ for 
“refusal…ever to admit a mistake 
or concede that it could be in error. 
It is always ready with a denial, 
explanation, or an excuse.”24 The 
Globe and Mail editorials showed 
little understanding of the need for 
accuracy in army casualty procedure. 
Just because stories of someone’s 
death had reached London did not 
mean that next-of-kin could receive 
notification. Avoiding inaccurate 
reports and needless grief prevented 
such reckless action. The Dieppe 
raid had demonstrated the dangers 
of ignoring procedure for speed. 
Nor did the arrival of rumours in a 
Canadian military district or even 
NDHQ mean that the Directorate 
of Records knew of the information. 
The Globe and Mail editors seemed 
more intent on building outrage to 
embarrass the King government 
than on understanding the situation. 
Nevertheless, slow processing of 
casualty reports left the army open 
to such accusations. 
 The third type of mistake in next-
of-kin notification happened when 
the press, contrary to regulations, 
published the names of casualties 
before official word reached the 
family. Slight revisions to the 
regulations sometimes occurred. 
The 10 October 1940 press censorship 
directive stated:
Casualties in the Canadian 
services should not be published 
or broadcast until an official 
casualty list has been released. 
There are three reasons for this:
a) So that relatives may receive 
their first notification through 
official sources.
b) So that no information of 
value to the enemy be revealed in 
details of the time, place and other 
circumstances of the casualty.
c) So as to thwart the possible 
attempts of enemy agents to lower 
morale by spreading false news of 
casualties.
Occasionally it happens that the 
facts of a casualty become known 
in a community before an official 
list has been published. In these 
cases, if the above requirements 
appear to have been satisfied, an 
exception may be made but editors 
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should consult the press censors 
before publication.25 
 The news media usually observed 
the directive, but in July 1942, the 
Canadian censorship authorities 
issued a reminder to wait for 
official notification following the 
premature publication of the names 
of two officer cadets who drowned 
in Ottawa.26 Several months later 
after the Dieppe raid, during an 
interview by Fred Griffin of the 
Toronto Star, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dollard Menard of the Fusiliers Mont-
Royal, mentioned Captain Alleyn’s 
death, whose parents then learned 
of this when the story appeared 
in L’Evènement.27 Considering the 
number of casualties at Dieppe, that 
merely one incident occurred shows 
the overall cooperation of the press. 
 The Sicilian campaign led to 
some major changes ensuring that 
next-of-kin received official news 
first. On 23 July 1943, the Ottawa 
records office learned that the 
Toronto Telegram and the Toronto 
Star published different reports each 
naming a wounded Canadian soldier. 
The surprised families of both men 
inquired to the records office, which 
knew nothing about the casualties. 
The same day, Lieutenant-Colonel 
F.X. Jennings, the Army’s director of 
public relations, while checking on 
two CP despatches containing names 
of wounded, discovered several other 
names unknown to the Directorate of 
Records. Jennings requested that the 
CP hold the stories. In spite of this, 
on 24 July, a CP despatch appeared 
in the Montreal Gazette; a clipping of 
this article in the army files has three 
names underlined with a prominent 
“no” written beside them. Either the 
CP ignored Jenning’s earlier advice 
or another dispatch arrived that 
CP sent to the newspapers without 
scrutiny.28 These incidents resulted 
in the adjutant general consulting 
the chief press censor, who sent 
a new directive instructing news 
organizations that whenever a story 
contained the name of a casualty, the 
publisher should send the copy to 
the censors for review. Alternatively, 
the press could contact the Army 
Directorate of Records directly, 
which would now have an officer on 
duty 24 hours a day in order to make 
checking easier.29 These concessions 
to the press appear to have resolved 
the problem, which like that of the 
unofficial notifications, resulted in 
part from the slow rate in which 
casualty reports reached Ottawa. 
 While these errors of casualty 
notification were shocking for the 
next-of-kin, the numbers of people 
directly affected remained relatively 
small. In contrast, the publication 
of casualty lists and totals helped 
shape the public image of the conflict, 
a critical concern to the Canadian 
Army. Nonetheless, as with many 
other policies, those of the more senior 
allies, particularly the British, limited 
the Canadian Army’s options. This 
occasionally led to accusations of the 
Canadian government deliberately 
concealing casualties to make the war 
more palatable. Thus, it is necessary 
to trace the development of army 
procedures for the publication of 
casualty lists and numbers and how 
Allied policies shaped them.
 Early in the war, the publication 
of  Canadian Army casualt ies 
resulted in little controversy, since 
casualties were relatively few. The 
first two Canadian Army casualty 
lists appeared on 22 June 1940. 
They provided the name, nature of 
casualty and the next-of-kin, but 
not the name of the regiment, lest 
the enemy calculate unit strength. 
Instead, the name appeared with 
a territorial pseudonym such as 
“Central Ontario regiment” or named 
the service branch such as “Royal 
Canadian Artillery.” Details about the 
circumstances did not appear in the 
list itself, although the introductory 
paragraph occasionally provided 
bare information, such as the cause 
of some accidental deaths. Still most 
casualties resulted from sickness or 
accidents, only sporadically from 
German bombs or torpedoes, and 
the numbers were relatively small: 
484 total dead and missing to 27 
November 1941.30 The Japanese 
attack on Hong Kong changed this. 
 The government and military 
a u t h o r i t i e s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r 
despatching two Canadian regiments 
to Hong Kong never intended them to 
engage in combat. Posting regiments 
to colonial garrisons released British 
troops to fight while ensuring that 
Canadians did not, helping keep 
the genie of conscription tightly 
sealed in its bottle. Unlike similar 
earlier missions in Newfoundland 
and Jamaica, it ended with the 
total loss of these units. When the 
Japanese entered into hostilities 
against the United States and Britain 
on 7 December 1941, the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of 
Canada, numbering 1,974 troops, 
found themselves in a doomed 
position with no chance of victory 
or relief. By 23 December, after 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Menard 
commanded Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
during the Dieppe operation. Public 
statements he made after the raid 
circumvented the official channels for 
casualty notification. 
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a brutal struggle, the garrison 
surrendered.31 The army had to rely 
on London for information on the 
battle. Carl Vincent’s discussion of 
the Hong Kong news shows that the 
government handled most of the 
publicity depending on scanty British 
reports based on Japanese sources 
and included deceptive British 
claims about a planned relief of the 
garrison by the HMS Prince of Wales.32 
NDHQ Public Relations did release 
a press circular trying to paint as 
bright a picture as possible. Quoting 
Mackenzie King and Ralston, it 
emphasised the heroic defence and 
claimed that it relieved pressure on 
Bataan and Malaya, and that it was so 
successful the Japanese commander 
needed to offer terms rather than 
demand “unconditional surrender.” 
This last claim allegedly came from “a 
Japanese report” indicating the lack 
of intelligence available to Ottawa 
about its own troops in Hong Kong.33 
 Given this dearth of accurate 
information, news about casualties 
was even more difficult to obtain. 
Communications from Hong Kong 
were sparse and there were few 
casualty reports. Ralston announced 
several Canadian casualties, two 
men s l ight ly  wounded on 10 
December, and a few other accounts 
of individual casualties emerged.34 
The first Hong Kong casualty list 
appeared on 31 December with only 
eleven names. The army admitted, 
“There is no likelihood of further lists 
for some time until the International 
Committee of the Red Cross can 
obtain details and send them here.”35 
 The casualty notification took 
a very long time and led to some 
frustration and accusations of 
political reasons for the delay. On 
3 February, Ralston responded to a 
Baptist minister’s accusations that 
the government was concealing the 
Hong Kong casualty list until after 
a February by-election. At least 
one letter to the government from 
a soldier’s family member made 
similar charges. Ralston admitted his 
limited sources of information, based 
only on the estimate of a reporter 
who escaped from Hong Kong and 
Top: Arrival of the Canadian brigade in Hong Kong, 16 November 1941; Bottom: A group of Canadian and British prisoners of war 
captured at Hong Kong are liberated at the end of the war. Canadian casualty notifications from Hong Kong were much delayed due 
the complete loss of the Hong Kong force which resulted in almost total dependence on the Japanese for information about casualties. 
This led to a lengthy period of uncertainty about the individual fates of most Canadian soldiers after the battle.
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speculated that one third of 
Canadians were dead, injured 
or captured during the fighting 
and the rest became prisoners 
after the surrender. Ralston 
refused to make any definitive 
statement on casualties with 
such incomplete information 
but wanted to dispel rumours 
placing the Canadian dead at 50 
percent.36 Later that month the 
government released estimates 
of the total casualties based on 
Japanese reports, given through 
Argentina as protecting power, 
of 1,689 Canadians prisoners, 
inferring that the remaining 296 
were dead or missing.37 
 The actual notifications of 
the individual soldier’s fate took 
over a year. On 2 September 
1942 ,  the  Department  o f 
National Defence announced 
the names of 507 prisoners, based 
on the receipt of prisoners’ letters 
carried by the Gripsholm, a diplomatic 
exchange ship, rather than by 
Japanese notification. The letters were 
“heavily censored” and many rejected 
outright by the Japanese, and the 
press release warned against drawing 
conclusions about the fate of those 
not mentioned.38 The first prisoner 
list, based on Japanese notification, 
consisted of 296 names and was 
released on 16 October 1942; others 
followed over the next months.39 By 
December, 1,593 individuals had 
been named, although not all by 
official Japanese reports.40
 Obtaining the complete lists 
required diplomatic manoeuvring. 
When the Japanese inquired about 
the status of Japanese interned in 
Canada, the government agreed to 
cooperate, provided the Japanese 
furnished all the names of Canadian 
military prisoners. On 17 August, 
the Department of External Affairs 
reported that the POW lists were 
“virtually complete.”41 The entire 
process took an excruciating year 
and a half. The Hong Kong incident 
occurred in the Pacific theatre and 
the casualty reporting process, unlike 
that in Europe, remained almost 
totally in the hands of the Japanese, 
the Red Cross, and the protecting 
power. Thus, it was an extremely 
atypical case for the Canadian Army 
during the Second World War.
 T h e  D i e p p e  r a i d  s h a p e d 
Canadian Army casualty reporting 
more than any other event. As with 
much else connected with the raid, 
the publication of casualties became 
clouded in the haze of distrust. 
Someone suspecting a conspiracy 
to deceive the public about Dieppe 
could not help but notice the delays in 
casualty reporting in the newspapers. 
The slow release of the casualties 
was suspicious enough, but delaying 
publication of the names of the 
missing, which comprised the vast 
majority of the casualties, until 15 
September was worse. Seemingly, 
the military hoped to delay negative 
public reaction or to preserve public 
morale by softening the blow. Some 
newspapers, however, were already 
suspicious. On 3 September, the 
Ottawa Journal warned that the 
slow release of casualty figures 
could lead to the “possible 
public impression – probably 
a wrong and dangerous one 
– that the military authorities 
themselves were trying to 
cover up something.”42 On 12 
September, W.D. Herridge, 
former Prime Minister R.B. 
Bennett ’s  brother- in- law, 
complained about the delay in 
a speech to the Ottawa Kiwanis 
Club.43 The release of the names 
of the missing on 15 September 
did not stop the criticism. The 
Regina Leader-Post accused 
the military of a “soft pedal” 
strategy to try to minimise 
the impact of the casualties.44 
On 26 September, the Nova 
Scotia Newspaper Association 
charged the government with 
covering up the Dieppe losses 
and demanded swifter release of 
information in the future.45 Over time, 
criticism of the delays faded and later 
works, apart from Gillis Purcell’s 
1946 thesis on Press Censorship, did 
not raise the issue. Purcell, citing 
Ross Munro, accused the military 
of abusing censorship to delay the 
casualty numbers to cushion the 
blow. In 1942, however, Purcell had 
written to McNaughton supporting 
the policy of withholding information 
from the press, even though he 
claimed already knew the “inside” 
story of Dieppe directly from Ross 
Munro.46
 The delay in publishing the list 
of the missing until 15 September 
seems suspicious. Until 25 August, 
the newspapers published the 
names of the missing along with 
the other casualties, but two days 
later announced a delay in reporting 
them to allow those who had avoided 
the Germans to escape. The notice 
observed, “Any word getting through 
to the enemy that they are missing is 
of course a signal for a search.”47 On 
4 September, the newspapers printed 
the military claim that the procedure 
The grave of 18-year-old Private Morton 
Thompson of the Royal Rifles of Canada. 
Stanley Cemetery, Hong Kong, October 1945.
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was “in accordance with agreed 
censorship practise of the United 
Nations.”48 It seems no coincidence 
that the Army Council offered this 
justification on the same day as the 
Ottawa Journal’s critical editorial 
about the delay.49
 These explanations, especially 
about escape, seem very far-fetched. 
Escape from Dieppe by anyone 
pinned down on the beaches and 
unable to get through impenetrable 
defences was impossible. A few 
Canadians escaped, but during 
transportation away from Dieppe 
after their capture. Secondly, the 
Germans were unlikely to assume 
that the missing had escaped because 
of the nature of modern warfare and 
amphibious operations. Artillery 
could blow men to pieces or their 
bodies float out to sea. The Germans 
left the dead in place below the high 
water line, hoping the tide might 
wash them higher up the beach; 
many bodies were likely carried out 
to sea.50 The idea that the Germans 
would go through the painstaking 
process of comparing the names of 
the missing to prisoner rolls, and 
use valuable manpower to search 
for them when they were probably 
dead, seems farcical. In fact, almost 
a year after the raid, 246 Canadians 
remained missing.51 
 The pressure for delay originated 
in the British Ministry of Information 
(MoI). On 22 August, CMHQ cabled 
NDHQ with a rather confused 
message: “as a result of a despatch 
from Adam Marshall, Montreal, to 
Evening Standard here, MoI request 
that names of officers and numbers 
of casualties be not …released to 
press for time being.”52 NDHQ 
requested specific information about 
the MoI’s concerns, explaining that 
they had already sent out casualty 
lists, although they had not given 
the total casualties.53 On 24 August 
CMHQ, after a long discussion 
with the MoI, responded to NDHQ, 
explaining that the concern of the 
MoI was naming missing personnel. 
In earlier Commando raids, some 
missing soldiers had been able to 
escape; therefore NDHQ should 
withhold publication of the missing 
for three weeks to a month, although 
next-of kin could still be informed. 
There was also an appeal to alliance 
unity, since British and Americans 
were also missing, any publication 
of the names of the missing would 
jeopardize “the desired security for all 
concerned.”54 How the publication of 
Canadian names would compromise 
the security of missing British and 
Americans went unexplained. 
NDHQ consented to the MoI policy 
on 24 August.55 In agreement with 
the British and Americans, the release 
date of the names for publication was 
set for 15 September.56 
 Was the MoI really concerned 
about the escape of missing personnel? 
There is some reason to suspect that 
German public relations photographs of 
Canadian soldiers captured at Dieppe. In 
Canada the delayed release of casualty 
information was linked to the need to 
deny useful information to the Germans 
that might help them recapture escaped 
prisoners. However, the delayed release 
was pushed by the British who did 
not want to release specific casualty 
information on any one operation.
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this concern was secondary to the 
goal of forcing the Canadians into 
adhering to the British policy of 
not releasing the total casualties 
of any action. On 8 September, 
during his defence of Dieppe in 
Parliament, Churchill reminded the 
House “it is not the practise to give 
exact figures of casualties in men 
or materiel suffered in individual 
operations.”57 This policy was to 
keep the enemy from being able to 
deduce the effectiveness of their 
tactics and the strength of British 
units. The reporting of all casualties 
was delayed for up to a month then 
divided up for publication so it was 
not apparent in which engagement 
they were incurred.58 This would 
work for the British forces in combat 
on several fronts but not for the 
Canadians, whose only action was 
the raid. To conceal the extent of 
the Dieppe disaster from the British 
people, the MoI had to convince 
Canada to withhold the publication 
of missing personnel. Still this only 
delayed the revelation and Churchill 
faced potentially embarrassing 
questions about discrepancies in his 
earlier claims about Dieppe following 
Canada’s publication of the total 
casualty figures.59 This move by 
British authorities was the first in a 
long effort to get Canada to comply 
with their casualty reporting policies. 
 Was the Canadian military 
convinced of the necessity to protect 
missing escapees, or did they simply 
comply to keep the casualty total 
from Canadians longer? Four factors 
indicate that the army took the MoI’s 
claims at face value. First, the “Roll 
of Honour,” as the casualty lists were 
titled, originally included both the 
missing and a running total of the 
casualties in the operation. This was 
not the action of an organization 
determined to conceal the losses. 
After three days of discussing the 
MoI request, the Army agreed to halt 
publication. If the Canadian army 
had been looking for an “easy out” on 
the casualties, it could have complied 
much more quickly. 
 Furthermore, the army actually 
believed that Canadians had escaped 
from the beaches, no matter how 
unlikely this might seem in hindsight. 
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  M e n a r d , 
during the “Heroes of Dieppe” 
tour, mentioned that according to 
information received in Britain, 
large numbers of Fusiliers Mont-
Royal had escaped into France from 
Dieppe.60 How Menard came by the 
“information” is unclear, although 
he may have been referring to four 
soldiers who later escaped from a 
German train, two of whom had 
made it to Gibraltar by 7 October.61 
The army quickly killed the story by 
instructing cable censors to hold all 
messages dealing with the remarks.62 
NDHQ ordered both CMHQ and 
commanders of all Canadian Home 
Forces Commands to prevent Dieppe 
personnel from making statements 
that could compromise the escape of 
Canadians at large.63 The speedy and 
vehement warning to all commands 
makes clear that they believed that 
many of the missing were still on the 
loose.
 Similarly, the British Air Ministry 
had requested the Royal Canadian 
Air Force (RCAF) withhold the names 
of their missing for five weeks to 
allow downed aircrew the chance to 
escape. The RCAF adopted this policy 
29 July 1942. 64 The newspapers were 
informed, “if only one of our men 
elude the enemy it will be worth 
the effort.”65 McNaughton probably 
knew of the RCAF decision, if not 
through official channels, because 
his own son, Squadron Leader Ian 
McNaughton, went missing in June 
1942.66
 The final indication that the 
Canadian Army accepted the MoI’s 
claims was its adoption of the practice 
of withholding the list of the missing, 
and later all casualties, for up to four 
weeks as standard policy.67 
 In the year following the Dieppe 
raid, NDHQ and the British War 
Office debated the casualty issue 
through CMHQ. The British insisted 
that Canadians wait a month before 
publishing any casualties because it 
would be potentially embarrassing 
if Canada published its losses earlier 
in joint operations and could assist 
enemy intelligence to assess the 
effectiveness of tactics and remaining 
unit strength.68 NDHQ felt the British 
system would not work in Canada, 
where there would be “violent protest 
from press and public opinion” 
regarding delays in publication and 
“require [a] complicated procedure 
open to criticism.”69 The War Office 
countered, “Other Dominions have 
agreed to the policy of delayed 
re leases .” 70 Yet  when NDHQ 
checked through the Canadian high 
commissioners with New Zealand 
and Australia, it discovered that 
the War Office misled them; in 
most circumstances, both dominions 
published casualties immediately 
after notification of next-of-kin. 
This deception obviously made 
NDHQ less trustful of the War 
Office. Because of the fear of criticism 
about censorship “on grounds other 
then security,” NDHQ demanded 
“a definite statement” from the 
War Office and Senior Canadian 
Combatant  in  Bri tain,  A.G.L. 
McNaughton, stating that delays 
in publishing casualty lists were 
imperative for security reasons.71 
McNaughton and the War Office 
agreed. Furthermore, the War Office 
argued that because Australians and 
New Zealanders served on several 
fronts, the enemy gained no valuable 
information. Canada’s situation, 
with 1st Canadian Division about 
to embark on the Sicily operation, 
differed. Should Canada become 
involved on several fronts, the 30-day 
delay in casualty publication might 
change. After months of debate, 
NDHQ reluctantly decided to follow 
British procedure, but reserved the 
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right to alter this policy if conditions 
changed, after consulting the War 
Office.72 Nonetheless, the competing 
motivations behind the NDHQ and 
War Office – worry over public 
criticism versus security concerns – 
guaranteed continued conflict. 
 Despite this agreement, the 
disputes continued during the Sicilian 
campaign. In early August, Ralston 
felt pressured to announce casualty 
numbers, especially after the US 
Secretary of War Stimson released the 
total American casualties in Sicily up 
to 22 July. Canadian Adjutant General 
H.F.G. Letson complained from 
Ottawa, “These unilateral agreements 
with Troopers [the War Office] which 
are not tied with the U.S., place 
Canada in the position of always 
being last with the news.” Adding to 
Ralston’s difficulties, the American 
papers published casualty records 
immediately following next-of-kin 
notification.73 A Wartime Information 
Board (WIB) memorandum reported 
the observations of a United Church 
clergyman in St. Lambert, Quebec 
that his parishioners, suspicious 
at the lack of information, “read 
between the lines” to speculate on 
casualty numbers and complained 
that Americans received more 
news. Letson requested that CMHQ 
arrange with the War Office for a 
similar release, and would go ahead 
the next day, 10 August, unless 
there were objections.74 Predictably, 
the War Office objected because, 
although the Canadian participation 
in Sicilian combat was completed, 
the information might be of value 
to the enemy for future operations. 
Undaunted, Ottawa kept up the 
pressure, and the War Office passed 
on the request to AFHQ, who acceded 
to Canada’s demands, although this 
process delayed the announcement 
until 19 August.75 This gave rise to 
rumours in Canada, like that one, 
repeated by an Ottawa “charwoman,” 
“15,000 Canadians had already 
been killed.”76 Despite this gossip 
and the sometimes acrimonious 
relationship with the War Office, the 
Canadians stuck to their agreement 
to withhold casualties for 30 days. 
The first casualty lists appeared in 
the newspapers on 13 August, a 
month after the landings, and the 
last on 16 September, over 30 days 
after the final Canadian actions.77 
Thus, despite some unhappiness 
with British policy, the Canadian 
Army adhered to the agreement and 
continued to do so during the Italian 
campaign. Surprisingly, when the 
Canadian Army did become active 
on two fronts in June 1944, the 30-day 
delay continued, even though there 
were grounds to challenge it.78
 The 1944 Normandy campaign 
resulted in further confusion about 
the publication of casualty numbers. 
Following the 6 June Normandy 
landings, apprehensive Canadians 
with memories of Dieppe awaited 
news of casualty numbers, but for 
The wounded await evacuation to a Casualty Clearing Station of the Royal 
Canadian Army Medical Corps in the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June 
1944. Canadians became impatient to know the D-Day casualty numbers, 
especially after the Americans announced theirs.
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several weeks none came. Predictably, 
the opposition and anti-government 
newspapers pushed Ralston for the 
figures. On 16 June, Conservative MP 
R.B. Hanson demanded the statistics; 
Ralston replied that the names would 
follow after 30 days as usual, but 
“security concerns” prevented 
giving totals, although he planned to 
communicate with Allied authorities 
and release them as soon as safely 
able.79 On 17 June, General Omar 
Bradley, commander of the American 
army in Normandy, announced the 
total American casualties to that date. 
This immediately led to cries that the 
Canadian government should do 
likewise. A Globe and Mail editorial 
said that nothing now prevented 
the release except the “security” 
of the government. The editorial 
reminded the public of the secrecy 
and delay surrounding the Dieppe 
casualties, to allow the missing to 
escape, a situation that no longer 
existed.80 Nor did the criticism come 
only from the Conservative press. A 
22 July despatch from J.A.M. Cook, 
war correspondent of the Liberal 
Winnipeg Free Press, demonstrated 
equal bitterness. He credited the 
Americans for a pattern of greater 
openness about casualties, while 
the Canadians appeared even more 
reluctant than the British did, hiding 
behind secrecy to conceal their 
losses. He cited the case of Ortona, 
the Christmas 1943 battle, of which 
the public never received precise 
casualty totals.81 Cook did not realise 
that in the Mediterranean, Canada 
was bound by agreement with the 
War Office in which the Americans 
were uninvolved. Additionally, the 
army never revealed the specific 
casualties for any battle. Dieppe was 
an exception because it was obvious in 
which battle the casualties occurred; 
in all other campaigns, casualty 
reports never specified the individual 
engagements. Cook’s article shows 
that the critiques emanated not 
only from political motivations, but 
also from frustration with the lack 
of information allowed by military 
regulations. 
 In response to these criticisms, 
Ralston asked CMHQ if he could 
provide an answer and release 
Canadian casualty figures. He learned 
that Bradley’s announcement of the 
American casualties in Normandy 
was unauthorized. The American 
First  Army censor incorrectly 
believed Bradley had the right to 
release the information because there 
were no specific orders from SHAEF 
or 21 Army Group prohibiting it. 
Bradley’s act did not automatically 
allow similar reporting of the 
casualties of the Second British Army 
in which the Canadians in Normandy 
then served.82 Ralston believed an 
acknowledgement of the mistake 
necessary, but Brigadier Penhale 
of CMHQ advised him,” since no 
public announcement of the mistake 
has been made…it would be wrong 
for him to refer to it as such in the 
house.”83 Although Ralston agreed 
to consider Penhale’s advice, political 
necessity led him to inform the 
House that same day. Hanson, again 
on the attack, demanded to know 
why “there is to be one rule for the 
American people and another for the 
Canadian people.” Ralston implied 
that Bradley violated an agreement 
on casualty numbers by making 
an unauthorized announcement, 
although he did not say so directly. 
The newspapers however, fully 
understood and pointed the fingers 
at Bradley. Ralston would wait until 
an authorized casualty release to 
preserve security.84 
 CMHQ and SHAEF reached an 
understanding that future casualty 
numbers would be coordinated 
with the Canadian government for 
simultaneous announcement.85 These 
arrangements had mixed results. On 
28 June, the release of the first total 
went smoothly enough; CMHQ 
received advance warning and 
coordinated the announcement in 
Canada. CMHQ completely missed 
a later announcement on 5 August 
because the junior staff handling 
SHAEF’s message believed it routine 
and did not treat it with the required 
urgency. The government again 
faced embarrassment because the 
Americans beat them to a casualty 
announcement. It is just as well 
that CMHQ then arranged with 
SHAEF for permission to publish 
total casualty figures after 30 days 
had passed, although the theatre they 
occurred in would remain secret. 
This became the method of casualty 
announcements for the remainder of 
the war.86
* * * * *
Canada, as a junior partner in the alliance, experienced 
many frustrations about casualty 
publication. The British resorted to 
manipulation to delay bad news after 
Dieppe and then later lied about the 
concurrence of other dominions to 
their policy. Canada’s agreement to 
submit to Allied policies frequently 
ended with embarrassment for the 
government, creating suspicions 
that Ralston and the army concealed 
casualty numbers to cover up 
reverses. In all these situations, the 
sleeping dragon of conscription for 
overseas service lay underneath 
much of the tension. By concealing 
casualty figures, the government may 
have been hiding a need for drafted 
reinforcements from Canada. Yet there 
is no evidence that the government 
or army ever manipulated casualty 
reports for political reasons. Rather, 
in these debates, the Canadian Army 
eventually chose cooperation with 
the Allies, over political expediency, 
despite the political fallout. This 
guaranteed that the Canadian Army 
observed the chain of command, as 
its formations served under British 
and Allied command. It is unusual 
in Canadian military history for 
domestic political concerns to take 
second place to military necessity, 
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but casualty reporting during the 
Second World War is one such 
case. In the end, poor relations 
with the USA and UK would have 
caused the Canadian government 
greater problems than occasionally 
appearing overly secretive.
 The casualty reporting of the 
Canadian Army during the Second 
World War to the next-of-kin and the 
press was not flawless. Occasional 
mistakes resulted from a desire 
to inform the next-of-kin as soon 
as possible. Other instances, such 
as clerical errors and the press 
releasing names too quickly, were 
regrettable but given the numbers of 
casualties during the war probably 
inevitable. Delays resulted from poor 
communications and publication 
agreements with allies. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that the sinister motivations 
behind errors and delays frequently 
alluded to by opposition politicians 
and press were fantasy. Still, these 
incidents doubtless contributed 
to many Canadians’ distrust of 
war news. The army attempted to 
inform next-of-kin and the press as 
quickly and accurately as possible 
within the limitations of security, 
communications, and agreements 
with allies. Regrettably, as the many 
incidents recounted here demonstrate, 
in politics the appearance of guilt can 
be as damaging as its reality. 
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